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NOTES 507 
DISCOVERY AND THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
In 1951, Nebraska adopted the principal parts of Rules 26 
to 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure pertaining to deposi-
tions and discovery. These sections became Sections 25-1267.02 to 
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25-1267.44 of the Nebraska statutes.1 Section 25-1267.02 provides 
that the deponent may be examined regarding any matter not 
privileged which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the 
pending action. Also Sections 25-1267.38 and 25-1267.39, relating 
to written interrogatories and discovery of documents, are limited 
to discovery of matter not privileged. 
Section 25-12062 provides that, "No ... physician, surgeon ... 
shall be allowed in giving testimony to disclose any confidential 
communications, properly entrusted to him in his professional ca-
pacity, and necessary and proper to enable him to discharge the 
functions of his office according to the usual course of practice of 
discipline." 
The purpose of this note is to examine the possibilities of ob-
taining a privileged communication to a physician before the trial 
of an action for personal injuries. 
I. The Physician-Patient Privilege 
There was no physician-patient privilege at common law.3 
Nebraska and thirty other states have enacted statutes extending 
a privilege to confidential communications made to physicians.4 
The policy behind these statutes is to encourage the patient to 
discuss more freely his ailments with a doctor while knowing that 
1 Neb. Rev. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1953). 
:i Neb. Rev. Stat. (Reissue 1948). 
a O'Brien v. General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corp., 42 F.2d 
48 (8th Cir. 1930); Friesen v. Reimer, 124 Neb. 620, 247 N.W. 561 
(1933); Koskovich v. Rodestock, 107 Neb. 116, 185 N.W. 343 (1921); 
Thrasher v. State, 92 Neb. 110, 138 N.W. 120 (1912). 
4 Ariz. Code Ann. § 23-103 (1939); Ark. Stat. § 72-628 (1947); Cal. 
Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Evid.) § 1881 (1946); Colo. Rev. Stat. 153-1-7(4) 
(1953); Idaho Code Ann.§ 9-203 (1947); Ind. Ann. Stat.§ 2-1714 (Burns 
1933); Iowa Code Ann. § 622-10 (1946); Kan. Gen. Stat. § 60-2805 
( 1949); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 213-200 (1953); Mich. Stat. Ann. § 27.911 
(1938); l\linn. Stat. Ann. § 595.02 (West 1945); Miss. Code Ann. § 1697 
(1942); l\lo. Ann. Stat. § 491.060 (Vernon 1949); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. 
§ 93-701-4 (1947); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1206 (Reissue 1948); Nev. Comp. 
Laws§ 89-74 (1929); N.M. Stat. Ann.§ 20-112 (1941); N.Y. Civ. Prac. 
Act§ 352; N.C. Gen Stat. § 8-53 (1953); N.D. Rev. Code § 31-0106 (1943); 
Ohio Gen. Code§ 2317.05 (1953); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 385 (1938); 
Ore. Rev. Stat. § 44.040 (1953); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28 § 328 (1938); 
R.I. Gen. Laws § 273-45 (1938); S.D. Code § 36.0101 (1939); Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-24-8 (1953); Wash. Rev. Code § 5.60.60 (1953); W. Va. Code 
Ann. § 4992 (1949); Wis. Stat. § 325.21 (1947); Wyo. Comp. Stat. Ann. 
§ 3-2602 (1945); South Carolina has the privilege by case decision. See 
Cole's Next of Kin v. Anderson, 191 S.C. 458, 4 S.E.2d 908 (1939). 
NOTES 509 
such information will not be divulged to his humiliation or dis-
grace.5 
Since the Nebraska physician-patient privilege extends only 
to confidential communications which are necessary and proper to 
enable the physician to discharge the functions of his office, an 
examination of what medical testimony is encompassed by that 
term is necessary. 
The Nebraska courts have not restricted the word "communi-
eations" to oral statements made by the patient to the doctor. In 
O'Donnell v. O'Donnell6 the court held a hospital chart made by a 
doctor while a patient was under his care for an operation was a 
confidential communication. In Stapleton v. Chicago B. & Q. Ry.,' 
an X-ray made of the patient's injured foot for the purpose of 
ascertaining the extent of the injuries was held to be a confidental 
communication. The court's syllabus stated: 
When a party submits to an examination, or inspection by a physi-
cian, for the purpose of learning the state of his health or the 
physical condition of any part of his anatomy, the knowledge thus 
acquired by the physician is privileged, and the physician is not 
permitted to testify to the condition he found, over objection based 
upon the statute. 
In Bryant v. Modern Woodmen of America,8 it was held that the 
physician's statements to the patient are privileged if based on 
facts disclosed by the patient which are confidential communica-
tions. 
Thus, it is seen that very important medical evidence concern-
ing the physical condition of a plaintiff in a personal injury ac-
tion is subject to the physician-patient privilege in Nebraska. 
Whether the defendant may examine this evidence before the 
trial by utilizing the discovery statutes has not been decided by 
the Nebraska Supreme Court. 
II. Purposes Of The Discovery Statutes 
Moore's Federal Practice9 points out the following benefits 
of a liberal discovery procedure: (1) it is of great assistance in 
ascertaining the truth and preventing perjury; (2) it is an ef-
fective means of detecting and exposing false, fraudulent, and 
5 Ansnes v. Loyal Protective Ins. Co., 133 Neb. 665, 276 N.W. 397 
(1937). 
6142 Neb. 706, 7 N.W.2d 647 (1943). 
7101 Neb. 201, 162 N.W. 644 (1917). 
s 86 Neb. 372, 125 N.W. 621 (1910). 
9 4 1\Ioore's Federal Practice 1014 (2d ed. 1950). 
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sham claims and defenses; (3) it makes available in a simple, 
convenient, and often inexpensive way facts which otherwise could 
not have been proved, except with great difficulty and sometimes 
not at all; ( 4) it educates the parties in advance of trial as to the 
real value of their claims and def ens es, thereby encouraging settle-
ments out of court; ( 5) it expedites the disposal of litigation, saves 
the time of the courts, and clears the docket of many cases by 
settlements and dismissals which otherwise would have to be tried; 
( 6) it safeguards against surprise at the trial, prevents delay and 
narrows and simplifies the issues to be tried, thereby expediting 
the trial; and (7) it facilitates both the preparation and the trial 
of cases. 
Ill. Discovery Before Trial By Judicial Methods 
Once the physician-patient privilege has been waived by the 
patient, discovery will be permitted.10 Because of the 1925 
amendment to Section 25-120711 by which the patient waives his 
privilege if he offers evidence with reference to his " ... physical 
or mental condition, or the alleged cause thereof .... " the privilege 
will be waived in every trial for personal injury. In view of this 
it is illogical to prevent defendant's discovery before trial of im-
portant medical evidence in a personal injury action by the un-
fortunate application of the physician-patient privilege designed 
for an entirely different purpose. The purposes of the discovery 
statutes are seriously hampered if the defendant is denied dis-
covery of evidence which would be admitted at the trial. 
In the absence of express waiver of the physician-patient 
privilege by the plaintiff in a personal injury action, there are 
judicial methods by which a defendant can obtain the medical 
evidence before the trial. Assume that A has brought an action 
in Nebraska against B for personal injuries received in an auto-
mobile accident as a result of B's negligence. B wishes to take 
the deposition of A's physician, C, under Section 25-1267.0212 con-
10 Munzer v. Swedish American Line, 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940); 
McKeever v. Teachers' Retirement Board, 99 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. ct. 1950); 
Leusink v. O'Donnell, 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949); rev'd on 
other grounds, 257 Wis. 571, 44 N.W.2d 525 (1950); see also In re 
Ericson's Will, 200 N.Y. l\Iisc. 1005, 106 N.Y.S.2d 203 (Surr. Ct. 1951) 
where the court allowed examination of privileged hospital records after 
waiver by personal representative of deceased. 
11 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1207 (Reissue 1948). 
12 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.01 (Cum. Supp. 1953) provides, "Any party 
may take the testimony of any person, including a party, by deposition 
upon oral examination or written interrogatories for the purpose of dis-
covery •... " 
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cerning C's treatment of A for a previous injury to A's back. He 
also wishes to examine medical records, including X-rays, made by 
C concerning that treatment under Section 25-1267.39.13 A re-
sists recovery on the grounds that the matter which B is seeking 
to discover is privileged as a confidential communication to a 
physician under Section 25-1206 . 
.A. IMPLIED WAIVER OF THE PHYSICI.AN-P.ATIENT PRIVILEGE 
(1) Doctrine of Implied Waiver in Other Jurisdictions 
B can argue that A has impliedly waived the physician-pa-
tient privilege by bringing an action for personal injuries. In 
Leusink v. O'Donnell,14 a Wisconsin case, the plaintiff brought an 
action to recover for damages sustained in an automobile acci-
dent. Pursuant to a Wisconsin statute,15 the defendant insurance 
company applied to the court for an order authorizing inspection 
of certain hospital and medical reports. The plaintiff contended 
that the records were privileged. The Wisconsin statute,1° pro-
viding for the physician-patient privilege, provided, "No physician 
or surgeon shall be permitted to disclose any information he may 
have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, 
necessary to enable him to serve such patient except only ... (4) 
with the express consent of the patient." 
The court all°'ved the defendant to examine all medical rec-
ords which concerned treatment of plaintiff's left arm and leg 
before and after the accident because the plaintiff was suing for 
impairment to those particular limbs. The court spoke in terms 
of a duty on the part of the plaintiff to furnish information as to 
the prior disability of his left arm and leg. The same result could 
have been reached by holding that the plaintiff impliedly waived 
his privilege by suing for injuries to his person. 
B can also submit an interrogatory to A under Section 25-
13 Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.39 (Cum. Supp. 1953) provides, "Upon 
motion of any party showing good cause therefor and upon notice to all 
other parties, and subject to the provisions of section 25-1267.22, the 
court in which an action is pending may (1) order any party to produce 
and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on behalf 
of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts, 
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which con-
stitute or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope 
of the examination permitted by section 25-1267.02 and which are in his 
possession, custody, or control. ... " 
14 255 Wis. 627, 39 N.W.2d 675 (1949), rev'd on other grounds, 257 
Wis. 571, 44 N.W.2d 525 (1950). 
15 Wis. Stat. § 269.57 (1947). 
16 Wis. Stat. § 325.21 (1947). 
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1267.371; asking him if he had ever injured his back prior to the 
accident. If A answers in the affirmative, B can argue that this 
impliedly waives the physician-patient privilege. 
In Munzer v. Swedish American Line,18 the plaintiff brought 
an action against the defendant for alleged wrongful acts of the 
defendant's agents occurring on board the defendant's ship. The 
plaintiff claimed that she became violently ill and suffered a 
mental and physical collapse, thereby becoming mentally unbal-
anced. Defendant attempted to obtain hospital records of a 
mental hospital where plaintiff had been treated prior to the al-
leged incident by a subpoena duces tecum and also attempted to 
examine the superintendents of those hospitals for the purpose of 
discovery. Plaintiff resisted discovery by claiming that the testi-
mony sought to be adduced and the records sought to be examined 
were privileged and at no time had she expressly waived the privi-
lege. 
In determining whether there was a privilege, the federal 
court applied the law of New York. The court held that the hospi-
tal records made by physicians attending a patient in a prof es-
sional capacity were privileged. Section 354 of the New York 
Civil Practice Act,19 relating to waiver of the physician-patient 
privilege provided, "The waivers herein provided for must be made 
in open court, on the trial of the action or proceeding, and a 
paper executed by a party prior to the trial providing for such 
waiver shall be insufficient as such a waiver." However, the 
court held that the plaintiff had impliedly waived her privilege 
by stating that she had been insane and had been treated in men-
tal hospitals prior to the alleged accident in answer to an interro-
gatory served on her under Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Therefore, discovery was permitted. Sections 25-
1267 .37 and 25-1267.38 of the Nebraska statutes were adopted 
from Rule 33 of the Federal Rules. 
(2) Doctrine of Implied Waiver in Nebraska 
There are no Nebraska cases recognizing an implied waiver 
of the physician-patient privilege. However, in Brown v. Brown20 
the Nebraska court held that a testator impliedly waived the at-
Ii Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1267.37 (Cum. Supp. 1953) provides, "Any party 
may serve upon any adverse party written interrogatories to be answered 
by the party served .... " Section 25-1267.38 provides, "Interrogatories 
may relate to any matters, not privileged .... " 
18 35 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1940). 
HI N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 354. 
:w 77 Neb. 125, 108 N.W. 180 (1906). 
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torney-client ])rivilege when he requested his attorney to sign as 
an attesting witness to his will. Since the testator knew that an 
attesting witness would have to testify as to his competency and 
that the testimony of the attorney would be necessary for proof 
of the testator's competency, the court reasoned that there had 
·been an implied waiver of the privilege. 
The implied waiver in the Brown case seems similar to an 
implied waiver of the physician-patient privilege. In the previous 
example A could make a full disclosure to his physician of his 
physical condition at the time of treatment of his injuries without 
fear of disclosure by C, his physician. The policy of the privilege 
is fulfilled at this point. Similarly, the testator in the Brown case 
would have had his communications with the attorney privileged 
if he had not asked the attorney to sign as an attesting witness. 
However, if A later decides to sue B for his injuries, A realizes, 
because of Section 25-1207,21 he will waive the privilege and B will 
be entitled to introduce any evidence of A's physical or mental 
condition. Likewise, in the Brown case the testator realized that 
if he asked the attorney to sign as an attesting witness, the privi-
lege would be waived. A, like the testator in the Brown case, is 
given a choice: (1) not suing and thus preserving his communica-
tion to C inviolate; or (2) suing and waiving the privilege. 
The moment A files his petition there should be a waiver of 
the privilege. If A will not be granted a privilege at the trial, 
then there is no reason why he should have a privilege when B at-
tempts to determine pre-trial information through the use of a 
deposition. 
B. PHYSICAL AND MENTAL EXAMINATION 
In the example, B could invoke Section 25-1267.4022 which 
provides, "In an action in which the mental or physical condition 
of a party is in controversy, the court in which the action is 
pending may order him to submit to a physical or mental examina-
tion by a physician. The order may be made only on motion for 
good cause shown and upon notice to be examined and to all other 
parties and shall specify the time, place, manner, conditions, and 
scope of the examination and the person or persons by whom it 
is to be made." 
This section was adopted from Rule 35 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure. Under the federal rules, A can obtain a copy 
21 See note 11 supra. 
22Neb. Rev. Stat. (Cum. Supp. 1953). 
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of this examination from the doctor who examined him. But 
Rule 35 (b) (2) provides: 
By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so 
ordered or by taking a deposition of the examiner, the party ex-
amined [A in the example] waives any privilege he may have in 
that action or any other involving the same controversy, regard-
ing the testimony of every other person who has examined or may 
thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical 
condition. 
So if A demands a copy of the medical report from the physi-
cian who examined him, he is deemed to have waived the privilege 
as to the testimony of other physicians who will later examine 
him or who have examined him in the past. 
But the Nebraska legislature did not adopt Rule 35 (b) (2). 
A will probably be entitled to obtain the Section 25-1267.40 report 
by the use of the other discovery provisions. But even if A does 
demand and receive the Section 25-1267.40 medical report, he does 
not waive the privilege as to past and future medical examinations. 
Of course B will always be entitled to the Section 25-1267.40 re-
port. But he will not be entitled any other medical examination 
reports of A, even though A has made a demand and received the 
Section 25-1267.40 medical report, because these other medical 
reports are shielded by A's privilege.23 
By employing Section 25-1267.40, B can discover A's physical 
condition before the trial. However, this procedure is ineifective 
for two reasons: (1) it is impossible to ascertain A's physical 
condition prior to the accident and immediately after the accident, 
and (2) time elapsing between the time of the accident and the 
time of the physical examination vitiates its value. Therefore, 
the use of Section 25-1267.40 does not solve B's difficulties. 
C. PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 
If B could remove the action filed against him to a federal 
court on grounds of diversity of citizenship, he could argue that 
the court is not bound by state laws on privilege and its waiver. 
There is a split in the federal courts on the question of whether 
the physician-patient privilege is a matter of substantive or pro-
cedural law. In Miller v. Pacific Mutual Life lnsiirance Com-
vany,2! the court held in a diversity action that the physician-pa-
tient privilege and waiver of the privilege were questions of sub-
stantive law and had to be determined by the law of Michigan. 
23 See note 31 infra. 
2! 116 F. Supp. 365 (W.D. Mich. 1953). 
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This case illustrates the view that the privilege is more akin to 
state than to federal interests and therefore federal courts should 
apply state law.2:; However, other federal courts, following Moore's 
view26 that the privilege is a procedural question, have held that 
questions of the privilege are not controlled by the rule of E-rie 
Railroad Company v. Tompkins.27 Therefore, if the federal court 
adopts Moore's view that the privilege is a procedural question, 
B can ask the court to interpret the privilege, and to hold that the 
privilege is impliedly waived by A bringing an action for personal 
injuries. 
D. PHYSICIAN AS AN EXPERT WITNESS: 
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 
In the example, assume that A's attorney asked a physician, 
D, an expert in a specialized field of medicine, to examine A for 
the sole purpose of helping A's attorney in the preparation of his 
case, and that D submitted a report of his finding and his opin-
ions based on those findings to A's attorney. B wishes to obtain 
this report under Section 25-1267.39 of the Nebraska statutes.2'' 
This section forces A to produce documents for B's inspection, 
copying, or photographing. But B may be confronted with a situa-
tion where the court will deny him discovery of D's report on 
grounds other than the physician-patient privilege. 
In San Francisco v. Superior Court,29 the defendant sued for 
a writ of mandamus to force the court to order a physician to 
answer certain questions germane to the action. The information 
sought was acquired by the plaintiff's physician who examined 
the plaintiff for the purpose of aiding plaintiff's attorneys in the 
preparation of their case. The court denied the defendant's writ 
of mandamus on the grounds that the doctor's testimony was sub-
ject to the attorney-client privilege in that the doctor acted as 
the attorney's agent to whom the client made communications. 
There was no physician-patient privilege in this case because Sec-
tion 188130 of the California Code provides for waiver of the privi-
25 Pugh, Rule 43 (a) and the Communication Privileged Under State 
Law: An Analysis of Confusion, 7 Vand. L. Rev. 556 (1954). 
26 Scourtes v. Albrect Grocery, 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Hum-
phries v. Pennsylvania Ry., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Panella v. 
Baltimore & 0. Ry., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1951). 
21 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
28 See note 13 supra. 
29 37 Cal.2d 227, 231 P.2d 26 (1951). 
30 Cal. Code Civ. Proc. Ann. (Evid.) § 1881 (1946) provides, " ... pro-
vided further, that where any person brings an action to recover damages 
for personal injuries, such action shall be deemed to constitute consent 
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lege " ... where any person brings an action to recover damages 
for personal injuries .... " Also the communications were made by 
the plaintiff to the physician for the purposes of examination, 
not treatment so there would be no privilege. Section 1881 of the 
California Code states further, "a licensed physician or surgeon 
can not ... be examined in a civil action, as to any information 
acquired in attending the patient, which was necessary to pre-
scribe or act for the patient .... " 
Granting that a communication made by a client to a bona 
fide agent of any attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal ad-
vice is privileged, it seems an undue extension of the attorney-
client privilege to consider the physician in this case as the agent 
of the attorney. It appears more like a back-handed method of 
preventing discovery from an adverse party's expert. Most of 
the courts have ignored the attorney-client privilege as the basis 
for denying discovery, and have instead denied discovery on the 
grounds that it was the plaintiff who paid the expert, not the 
defendant.31 Therefore, if B shows good cause, and can avoid the 
"who paid the expert" factor, he may be allowed discovery of the 
report submitted by D to A's attorney. 
IV. Legislative Action Pennitting Discovery Before Trial 
In order to insure the fulfillment of the policy of the dis-
covery statutes, legislation should be enacted which would definite-
ly permit a defendant in a personal injury action to discover the 
plaintiff's medical evidence before the trial. This result may be 
accomplished in three ways: (1) amend the statutes on privilege 
to include a waiver of the physician-patient privilege when an 
action for personal injuries is commenced or (2) amena "he dis-
covery statutes to permit discovery of matter subject to the physi-
cian-patient privilege in personal injury actions or (3) abolish the 
physician-patient privilege. 
by the person bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed 
for or treated said person and whose testimony is material in said action 
shall testify .... " 
31 Sachs '" Aluminum Co. of American, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948). 
affirming Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 
425 (N.D. Ohio 1947); Cox v. Pennsylvania Ry., 9 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 
1949); Taine, Discovery of Trial Preparations in the Federal Courts, 50 
Col. L.R. 1026 (1950); 4 l\Ioore's Federal Practice 1152 (2d ed. 1950). 
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A. AMENDING THE PRIVILEGE STATUTES 
California,32 one of the jurisdictions having the physician-
patient-privilege, has a statute providing for a waiver when an 
action for personal injuries is brought. In states, " ... where any 
person brings an action to recover damages for personal injuries, 
such action shall be deemed to con...cditute con...qent by the per..."Jln 
bringing such action that any physician who has prescribed for 
or treated said person and whose testimony is material in said 
action shall testify .... " The Model Code of Evidence33 in Rule 
223 (3) has eliminated the privilege in actions for personal in-
juries. It states, "There is no privilege under Rule 221 [providing 
for a physician-patient privilege] in an action in which the condi-
tion of the patient is an element or factor of the claim or defense 
of the patient or any party claiming through or under the pa-
tient .... " Pennsylvania's privilege statute34 provides for an ex-
ception " ... in civil cases, brought by such patient, for damages 
on account of personal injuries." 
B. AJ\IENDING THE STATUTES ON DISCOVERY 
It would seem more wise to amend the discovery statutes and 
provide for pre-trial discovery than to amend the privilege statute 
and extend the waiver doctrine. The problem involved is more 
germane to discovery than waiver. Waiver is a fiction which the 
law invented to express a policy that a plaintiff bringing a per-
sonal injury action should not be allowed to withhold medical evi-
dence of his physical condition which is essential to the def end-
ant's case. By adopting the theory of waiver to allow discovery 
before a trial, the legislature would be unnecessarily extending 
this fiction into the field of discovery. Therefore, the problem 
should be attacked directly by amending the discovery statutes. 
C. ABOLISHMENT OF THE PHYSICIAN-PATIENT PRIVILEGE 
It is obvious that if there were no physician-patient privilege, 
discovery before trial of matter presently subject to the privilege 
32 See note 30 supra. 
33 :Model Code of Evidence, Rule 223(3) (1942). 
34 Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 28, § 328 (1938) provides, "No person authorized 
to practice physics or surgery shall be allowed in any civil case, to dis-
close any information which he acquired in attending the patient in a 
professional capacity, and which was necessary to enable him to act in 
that capacity, which shall tend to blacken the character of the patient, 
without consent of said patient, except in civil cases, brought by such 
patient, for damages on account of personal injuries." 
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would be permissible. There are sixteen states35 which do not 
have the privilege-sixteen states which do not seem to be suffer-
ing from its absence. This fact would seem to cast some doubt on 
the necessity for the privilege. 
Conclusion 
A literal interpretation of the Nebraska law on the physician-
patient-privilege and waiver of that privilege would appear to 
hamper seriously the efficacy of those provisions in personal in-
jury actions. However, Wisconsin and New York have invoked 
the doctrine of implied waiver to permit discovery of privileged 
matter by the defendant before the trial of the action. California 
and Pennsylvania have express statutory provisions in their privi-
lege statutes allowing discovery before the trial. Until legislative 
action completely erases all doubt on the question of whether dis-
covery of matter subject to the privilege will be allowed before 
the trial of a personal injury action, courts should permit dis-
covery through invocation of the "implied waiver" of the physi-
cian-patient privilege. 
William H. Hein, '55 
3~ Alabama. Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, 
l\Iaine, i.\1aryland, l\1asschusetts, New Hampshire, Ne"· Jersey, Tennessee, 
Texas, Virginia, and Vermont. South Carolina has the privilege by case 
decision. See note 4 supra. 
